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LOYAL PUBLICATION SOCIETY, 

863 BKOADW A Y . 
JYo. 13. 

HOW A EKEE PEOPLE 

CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 

BY CHARLES J. STILLE. 



We have known hitherto in this country so little of the actual realities 
of war on a grand scale, that many are beginning to look upon the violent 
opposition to the Government, and the slowness of the progress of our arms, 
as signs of hopeless discouragement. History, however, shows us that 
these are the inevitable incidents of all wars waged by a free people. This 
might be abundantly illustrated by many remarkable events in English his- 
tory, from the days of the great Rebellion, down through the campaigns 
of the Prince of Orange and of Marlborough, to the wars which grew out of 
the events of the French Revolution. War is always entered upon amidst 
a vast deal of popular enthusiasm, which is utterly unreasoning. It is the 
universal voice of history, that such enthusiasm is wholly unreliable in 
supporting the prolonged and manifold burdens which are inseparable from 
every war waged on an extensive scale, and for a long period. The popular 
idea of war is a speedy and decisive victory and an immediate occupation 
of the enemy's capital, followed by a treaty of peace by which the objects 
of the war are permanently secured. Nothing is revealed to the excited 
passions of the multitude but dazzling visions "of national glory, pur- 
chased by small privations, and the early and complete subjugation of theii 
enemies. It is, therefore, not unnatural that at the first reverse they should 
yield at once to an unmanly depression, and, giving up all for lost, they 
should vent upon the Government for its conduct of the war, and upon the 
army and its generals for their failure to make their dreams of victory 
realities, an abuse as unreasoning as was their original enthusiasm. 

Experience has taught the English people that the progress of a war 
never fulfils the popular expectations ; that although victory may be assured 
at last to patient and untiring vigor and energy in its prosecution, yet dur. 
ing the continuance of a long war, there can be no well-founded hope of a 
uniform and constant series of brilliant triumphs in the field, illustrating 
the profound wisdom of the policy of the Cabinet ; that, on the contrary,, all 
war, even that which is most successful in the end, consists rather in 
checkered fortunes, of alternations of victory and disaster, and that its con 






■ i 



2 HOW A FREE PEOFLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 

duct is generally marked by what were evidently, when viewed in the light 
of experience, blunders so glaring in the policy adopted by the Government, 
or in the strategy of its generals, that the wonder is success was achieved 
at all. The English have thus been taught that the true characteristic of 
public opinion, in its judgment of a war, should be, not so much hopefulness 
or impatience of immediate results, but rather a stern endurance — that 
King-quality of heroic constancy which, rooted deep in a profound convic- 
tion of the justice of the cause, supports a lofty public spirit equally well in 
the midst of temporary disaster, and in the hour of assured triumph. 

We have had no such experience here. Our people are perhaps more 
easily excited by success, and more readily depressed by reverses, than the 
English, and it is, therefore, worth while to consider how they carried on 
war on a large scale and for a protracted period. It will be found, if we 
mistake not, that the denunciations of the Government, so common among 
us of late, and the complaints of the inactivity of the army, have their exact 
counterpart in the history of the progress of all the wars in which England 
has been engaged since the days of the great Rebellion. He who draws 
consolation from the lessons of the past, will not, we think, seek comfort in 
vain when he discovers that in all those wars in which the Government and 
the army have been so bitterly assailed, (except that of the American Revo- 
lution,) England has at last been triumphant. It is worth while, then, to 
look into English history to understand how war is successfully carried on, 
notwithstanding the obstacles which, owing to a perverted public opinion, 
exist within the nation itself. These difficulties, although they inhere in 
the very nature of a free government, often prove, as we shall see, more 
fruitful of embarrassment to the favorable prosecution of a war than the 
active operations of the enemy. 

We propose to illustrate the propositions which we have advanced, by a 
study of the series of campaigns known in English history as the Peninsu- 
lar War. We select this particular war because we think that in many of 
its events, and in the policy which sustained it, there are to be observed 
many important, almost startling, parallelisms with our present struggle. 
We have, of course, no reference to any similarity existing in the principle 
which produced the two wars, but rather to the striking resemblance in the 
modes adopted by the two people for prosecuting war on a grand scale, and 
for the vindication of a principle regarded as of vital importance by them. 

The Peninsular War, on the part of England, as was contended by the 
ministry during its progress, and as is now universally recognized, was a 
struggle not only to maintain her commercial supremacy, (which was then, 
as it is now, her life,) but also to protect her own soil from invasion by the 
French, by transferring the scene of conflict to distant Spain. The general 
purpose of assisting the alliance against Napoleon seems always to have 
been a subordinate motive. It is now admitted by all historians, that upon 
success in this war depended not only England's rank among nations, but 
her very existence as an independent people. The war was carried on for 
more than five years, and on a scale, so far as the number of men and the 
extent of the military operations are concerned, until then wholly unat- 
tempted by England in her European wars. The result, as it need not be 
said, was not only to crown the British arms with the most brilliant and 



HOW A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 3 

undying lustre, but also to retain permanently in their places the party 
^ whose only title to public favor was that they had carried on the war 
against the most serious obstacles, and brought it to a successful termina- 
tion. Thus was delayed, it nay be remarked, for at least twenty years, 
" the adoption of those measures of reform which at last gave to England that 
place in modern civilization which had long before been reached by most 
of the nations of the Continent, by passing through the trials of a bloody 
revolution. If we, then, in our dark hours, are inclined to doubt and de- 
spondency as to the final result, let us not forget the ordeal through which 
England successfully passed. We shall find that, in the commencement, 
there was the same wild and unreasoning enthusiasm with which we are 
familiar ; the same bitter abuse and denunciation of the Government at the 
first reverses ; the same impatient and ignorant criticism of military opera- 
tions ; the same factious and disloyal opposition on the part of a powerful 
party; the same discouragement and despondency at times on the part* of 
the true and loyal ; the same prophecies of the utter hopelessness of suc- 
cess ; the same complaints of grievous and burdensome taxation, and pre- 
dictions of the utter financial ruin of the country ; the same violent attacks 
upon the Government for its arbitrary decrees, and particularly for the sus- 
pension of the writ of habeas corpus ; the same difficulties arising from the 
inexperience of the army ; and the same weakness on the part of the Gov- 
ernment in not boldly and energetically supporting the army in the field. 
These are some of the more striking parallelisms between the Peninsular 
War and our own struggle, which a slight sketch of the progress of that 
war will render very apparent. 

The insurrection in Spain which followed immediately upon a knowledge 
of the intrigues of Napoleon at Bayonne, in April, 1807, by which the 
royal f»ily was entrapped into, an abdication of its rights to the throne, 
and Joseph Bonaparte made king of that country, roused universal admira- 
tion and enthusiasm in England. It was thought by all parties that an 
obstacle to the further progress of Napoleon's schemes of the most formida- 
ble character had at last been found. It was the first popular insurrec- 
tion in any country against Napoleon's power, and consequently, when the 
deputies from the Asturias reached England imploring succor, their appeals 
excited the popular feeling to the highest pitch, and the opposite parties in 
Parliament and the country vied with each other in demanding that Eng- 
land should aid the insurrection with the whole of her military power. It 
is curious to observe, that when the question of aid was brought before Par- 
liament, Mr. Canning and Mr. Sheridan, who had probably never acted to 
gether before on any political question, rivalled each other in their praise 
of the Spaniards, and in their expressions of hope and belie! that Napoleon 
had at last taken a step which would speedily prove fatal to him. Large 
supplies were voted by acclamation, and an important expedition, afterwards 
operating in two columns, one under the command of Sir John Moore, the 
other under that of Sir Arthur Wellesley, was dispatched to the Peninsula 
to aid the insurgents. It is not our purpose to trace the progress of this 
expedition, but merely to notice the effect which its immediate results, the 
retreat to Corunna and the Convention of Cintra, produced upon popular 
feeling in England. As ws look back on the history of that time, the folly 



4 HOW A FKEE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 

and madness which seized upon the popular mind when the terms of the 
Convention of Cintra became known, can only be explained by recalling the 
high-wrought and extravagant expectations of immediate success with 
which the war had been entered upon. By this Convention, and as the re- 
sults of a single battle, Portugal was wholly evacuated by the French ; yet 
such were the unreasonable demands of public opinion, that because the 
whole French army had not been made prisoners of war, the Ministry was 
almost swept away by the outburst, and it could only control the storm 
by removing the two generals highest in rank. It required all the family 
and political influence of the third, Sir Arthur Wellesley, to enable him to 
retain his position in the army. The disastrous retreat of Sir John Moore's 
army to Corunna, and the easy triumphs of the French at that period 
throughout all Spain, plunged the English into despair. Going from one 
extreme to another, men who, only three months before, had quarreled 
with the army in Portugal because it had not given them the spectacle of a 
French marshal and twenty thousand of his soldiers as prisoners of war at 
Spithead, now spoke openly of the folly of any attempt at all on the part of 
the English to resist the progress of the French arms in the Peninsula. In 
Parliament there was the usual lame apology for disaster, an attempt to 
shift the responsibility from the Ministry to the General in command ; but 
the great fact, that all their hopes had been disappointed still remained, 
and after the explanations of the Government the general despondency be- 
came more gloomy than ever. It is not difficult in the light of history to 
see where the blame of failure should rest. Any one who is disposed now 
to sneer and cavil at the shortcomings of our own administration, to impute 
to it views short-sighted and impracticable in their policy, and to blame it 
for want of energy and vigor in the prosecution of the war, has only to turn 
to Colonel Napier's account of the stupid blunders of the English govern- 
ment, its absurd and contradictory orders, its absolute ignorance not only 
of the elementally principles of all war, but of the very nature of the country 
in which the army was to operate, and of the resources of the enemy, to be 
convinced that had its mode of carrying on hostilities (which was the popu- 
lar one) been adopted, in six months not an English soldier would have re- 
mained in the Peninsula except as a prisoner of war. The history of this 
campaign contains important lessons for us ; it shows conclusively that the 
immediate results of war are never equal to the public expectation, and that 
if this public expectation, defeated by the imbecility of the Government, or 
soured by disaster in the field, is to be the sole rule by which military 
operations are to be judged, no war for the defense of a principle can long 
be carried on. 

Fortunately for the fame and the power of England, the Ministry, al- 
though ignorant of the true mode of prosecuting hostilities, had sense 
enough to perceive that their only true policy was perseverance. They 
were strong enough to resist the formidable opposition which the events we 
have referred to developed in Parliament and the country, and, undismayed 
by the experience of the past, concluded a. treaty with the Provisional Gov- 
ernment of Spain, by which they pledged England never to abandon the 
national cause until the French were driven across the Pyrenees. The 
army was placed upon a better footing, was largely reenforced, and Sir 



HOW A FKEE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 5 

Arthur Welleslcy was appointed to the chief command. The Government 
not yet wholly awakened from its illusions, still thought it practicable to 
reach Madrid in a single campaign, and to that end the efforts of Welling- 
ton were directed. It became necessary first to dislodge Soult at Oporto, 
and the magnificent victory of the English, gained by the passage of the 
Douro at that point, went far to revive confidence at home in the invinci- 
bility of their army. Yet so clear is it that victory in war often depends 
upon what, for some better name, we may call mere good fortune, that we 
have the authority of the Duke of Wellington himself for saying, that this 
army, which had just exhibited such prodigies of valor, was then in such a 
state of demoralization, that although " excellent on parade, excellent to 
fight, it was worse than an enemy in a country, and liable to dissolution 
alike by success or defeat." Certainly no severer criticism has ever been 
justified by the inexperience and want of discipline of our own raw levies 
than that contained in this memorable declaration. A little reflection and 
candor might teach us, as it did the English, that nothing can compensate 
for the want of experience, and that every allowance is to be made for dis- 
asters where it is necessary to educate both officers and soldiers in the 
actual presence of the enemy. Wellington soon afterwards moved towards 
the Spanish frontier, hoping by a junction with the army under Cuesta to 
fight a battle with the French, which would open to him the road to the 
capital. The battle was fought at Talavera, and although it has since been 
claimed by the English as one of their proudest victories, and the name of 
Talavera is now inscribed upon the standards of the regiments who took 
part in it with those of Salamanca and Vittoria, yet the result was in the 
end, that Wellington was obliged to retreat to Lisbon, just three months 
after he had set out from that place, having left his wounded in the hands 
of the French, having escaped as if by a miracle from being wholly cut off 
in his retreat, and having lost one third of his army in battle and by disease. 
Of course, the blame was thrown upon the want of cooperation on the part 
of the Spaniards. This we have nothing to do with ; it is the result of the 
campaign with which we are concerned. Dependence upon the Spaniards 
was certainly, as it turned out, a fault, but it was one of the fair chances 
of war, and it was a fault in which AYellington, made wise by experience, 
was never again detected. 

When the news of the untoward result of this campaign reached England, 
the clamor against the Government and against Wellington was quite as 
violent as that excited by the disasters of Sir John Moore's army. The op- 
position in Parliament took advantage of this feeling to rouse public opinion 
to such a manifestation as might compel the termination of the war in the 
Peninsula, and drive the ministry from office. The Common Council of 
London, probably a fair exponent of the opinions of the middle class, peti- 
tioned the King not to confirm the grant of £2000 year, which the Ministry 
had succeeded in getting Parliament to vote to Wellington. The petitioners 
ridiculed the idea that a battle attended with such results should be called 
a victory. "It should rather be called a calamity" they said, "since we 
were obliged to seek safety in a precipitate flight, abandoning many thou- 
sands of our wounded countrymen into the hands of the French." In the 
opinion of the strategists in the Common Council and of their friends in 



6 HOW A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A IOKG "WAR. 

Parliament, Wellington might be a brave officer, but he was no general ; he 
had neglected the protection of his flanks and his line of communication. 
When it is remembered, that at this very time, Wellington, profiting by 
the experience of the past, was diligently making his army really effective 
•within the lines of Torres Vedras, from which stronghold it was in due 
time to sally forth like a giant refreshed, never to rest until it had planted 
the English flag on the heights of Toulouse, we may perhaps smile at the 
presumption of those who, sincere well-wishers to the cause, displayed only 
their ignorance in their criticism. But what shall be said of those who, 
knowing better, being quite able to understand the wisdom of the policy 
adopted by the General to insure success in the stupendous enterprise in 
which the country was engaged, yet with a factious spirit, and with the sole 
object of getting into power themselves, took advantage of the excitement 
of the ignorant multitude to paralyze the energies of the Government ? 

That hideous moral leprosy, which seems to be the sad hut invariable 
attendant upon all political discussions in a free government, corrupting the 
very sources of public life, breeding only the base spirit of faction, had 
taken complete possession of the opposition, and in its sordid calculations, 
the dishonor of the country, or the danger of the army, was as nothing pro- 
vided the office, the power, and the patronage of the Government were se- 
cured in their hands. It was of little concern to them, provided they could 
drive the Ministry from office, whether its downfall was brought about by 
blunders in Spain, or by the King's obstinacy about Catholic Emancipation, 
or by an obscure quarrel about the influence of the Lords of the bed-cham- 
ber. The sincerity of these declamations of the opposition was curiously 
enough put to the test some time afterwards, when the Ministry, wearied 
by the factious demagogueism with which all their measures were assailed, 
and understanding perfectly their significance, boldly challenged their op- 
ponents, if they were in earnest, to make a definite motion in the House of 
Commons, that Portugal should be abandoned to its fate. This move com- 
pletely unmasked their game, and for a time silenced the clamor, for it was 
perfectly understood on all hands, that deep in the popular heart, undis- 
turbed by the storms which swept over its surface, there was a thorough 
and abiding conviction of the absolute necessity of resisting the progress of 
Napoleon's arms, and that the real safety of England herself required that 
that resistance should then be made in Spain. Still this noisy clamor did 
immense mischief; it weakened the Government, it prolonged the strife, it 
alarmed the timid, it discouraged the true, and it so far imposed upon Na- 
poleon himself, that thinking that in these angry invectives against the 
Government he found the real exponent of English sentiment, he concluded, 
not unnaturally, that the people were tired and disgusted with the war, and 
that the privations which it occasioned were like a cancer, slowly but surely 
eating out the sources of national life. 

In the midst of these violent tumults at home, Wellington was silently 
preparing for his great work within the lines of Torres Vedras. It would 
not be easy to overrate the difficulties by which he was surrounded. He 
was fully aware of the outcry which had been raised against him ; he knew 
that from a Cabinet weakened by internal dissensions, and on the verge of 
overthrow from the vigorous assaults of the opposition, and from its own 



HOW A FEEE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAE. / 

unpopularity occasioned by the failure of the Walcheren expedition, and 
the disasters in the Peninsula, he could expect no thorough and reliable 
support Indeed, the Government, almost in despair, threw the whole re- < 
sponsibility for the military measures on the Continent on him alone. He 
accepted the responsibility in a most magnanimous spirit. " I conceive," 
he writes, " that the honor and the interests of the country require that 
we should hold our position here as long as possible, and please God, I will 
maintain it as long as I can. I will neither endeavor to shift from my own 
shoulders on those of the Ministers the responsibility for the failure, by 
calling for means which I know they cannot give, and which perhaps would 
not add materially to the facility of attaining our object ; nor will I give to 
the Ministers, who are not stfong, and who must feel the delicacy of then- 
own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position which, 
in my opinion, the honor and interest of the country require they should 
maintain as long as possible." Animated by this heroic sense of duty, the 
Commander-in-Chief prepared to contend against the 200,000 men under 
Massena, whom Napoleon had sent to chase him into the sea. He had, to 
oppose this immense force, only 25,000 English soldiers, and about the 
same number of Portuguese, tolerably organized. Secure within the lines 
of Torres Vedras, he quietly waited until the want of provisions, and the 
utter hopelessness of an assault upon his position forced upon Massena the 
necessity of retreating. Then instantly pursuing, in a series of battles, of 
almost daily occurrence, he drove Massena out of Portugal, and reached 
once more the Spanish frontier in May, 1811, nearly three years after the 
English had sent an army to the assistance of the Peninsula. Here he 
rested for a long time, making preparations for the siege of Badajoz and 
Ciudad Rodrigo, operations requiring time, and the success of which was 
essential to the safety of the army in its further progress. Still, so little 
was Wellington's position, military and political, understood in England, 
even at that time, after all the proofs he had given of consummate ability, 
that public clamor was again roused against the mode adopted by him for 
conducting the war. As there were no disasters at which to grumble, 
people talked of "barren victories," because like those of Crecy and Azin- 
court, they brought no territorial acquisitions, forgetting then what they 
have 'never been weary of boastingly proclaiming since, that these victories 
were the best proofs that their army was distinguished by the highest mili- 
tary qualities, which, properly directed and supported, were capable of achiev- 
ing the most glorious results. So profound was the conviction of the im- 
mense superiority of the French, both in numbers and in the qualify of 
their troops, that the public mind was in a state of feverish anxiety, and 
many of the stoutest hearts gave way to despair. About this period Sir 
Walter Scott wrote to Mr. Ellis : " These cursed, double cursed news (from 
Spain) have sunk my spirits so much, that I am almost at disbelieving a 
Providence ; God forgive me, but I think some evil demon has been per- 
mitted in the shape of this tyrannical monster, whom God has sent on the 
nations visited in his anger. The spring-tide may, for aught I know, break 
upon us in the next session of Parliament. There is an evil fate upon us 
in all we do at home or abroad." So Sir James Mackintosh, writing to 
Gentz, at Vienna : " I believe, like you, in a resurrection, beca ase I believe 



8 HOW A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 

in the immortality of civilization, but when, and by whom, and in what 
form, are questions which I have not the sagacity to answer, and on-which 
ic would be boldness to hazard a conjecture. A dark and stormy night, a 
black series of ages may be prepared for our posterity, before the dawn that 
opens the more perfect day. Who can tell how long that fearful night may 
be before the dawn of a brighter morrow ? The race of man may reach the 
promised land ; but there is no assurance that the present generation will 
not perish in the wilderness." As if to render the situation more gloomy, 
if possible, the Marquis of Wellesley, the brother of Wellington, left the 
Ministry upon the avowed ground that the Government would not support 
the war with sufficient vigor. History has stripped his conduct of any such 
worthy motive, and shown that the real trouWe was his anxiety to supplant 
Mr. Perceval. At the same time, the attack was kept up in the opposite 
quarter. "No man in his senses," says Sir Francis Burdett, " could enter- 
tain a hope of the final success of our arms in the Peninsula. Our laurels 
were great, but barren, and our victories in their effects mere defeats." Mr. 
Whitbread, too, as usual, was not behindhand with his prophecies. " He 
saw no reason," he said, " to alter his views respecting peace ; war must 
otherwise terminate in the subjugation of either of .the contending powers. 
They were both great ; but this was a country of factitious greatness. 
France was a country of natural greatness." So, General Tarleton " had 
the doctrine of Mr. Fox in his favor, who wished for the pencil of a Cer- 
vantes to be able to ridicule those who desired to enter upon a continental 
war." * 

Thus, from universal enthusiasm in favor of the Spanish war, public 
opinion, at first manifesting itself through the factious spirit of the opposi- 
tion, at length spoke through all its organs, in tones of despondency and 
despair, of the situation and prospects of the country, and simply because 
there had not been that sort of military success which it could understand, 
to sustain and direct it. Universal distrust seized upon the public mind ; 

* The following description of the opposition of that day, taken from the Annual 
Register for 1812, bears so striking a likeness to the peculiarities of the leaders of 
an insignificant, but restless faction among us, that, omitting the old-fashioned 
drapery of the proper names, they seem to have sat for the photograph. " It may 
be remarked as a most singular circumstance, that those persons in this country 
who profess to have the greatest abhorrence of ministerial tyranny and oppression, 
look with the utmost coolness on the tyranny and oppression of Bonaparte. The 
regular opposition do not mention it with that abhorrence which might be expected 
from them ; but the leaders of the popular party in Parliament go further. They 
are almost always ready to find an excuse for the conduct of Bonaparte. The most 
violent and unjustifiable acts of his tyranny raise but feeble indignation in their 
minds, while the most trifling act of ministerial oppression is inveighed against with 
the utmost bitterness. Ready and unsuspecting credence is given to every account 
of Bonaparte's success ; while the accounts of the success of his opponents are re- 
ceived with coldness and distrust. Were it not for these things, the conduct of Mr. 
Whitbread and his friends would be hailed with more satisfaction, and inspire more 
confidence with the real lovers of their country ; for they deserve ample credit for 
the undaunted and unwearied firmness with which they have set themselves against 
abuses and against every instance of oppressioa." 



HOW A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAP*. 9 

and had it not been for the heroic constancy of that great commander, -whose 
task in supporting the Ministry at home was at least as difficult as that of 
beating the French in Spain, the glory of England had sunk forever. 

Yet it happened, as it so often happens in the order of Divine Pro- 
vidence, in the moral as in the physical world, that the night was 
darkest just before dawn. Amidst all this universal despondency and 
sinister foreboding, events were preparing which in a few short months 
changed the whole face of Europe, and forced back that torrent of revolu- 
tionary success which had spread over the whole continent, until it over- 
whelmed the country where it had its source in complete ruin. The dis- 
cussions in Parliament to which we have referred, took place in February, 
1S12. With the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 18th of January of that 
year, with the fall of Badajoz on the 2Gth of March, the first battle of Sala- 
manca on the 20th of July, and Napoleon's invasion of Russia in June in 
the same year, began the downfall of the French Empire. 

Wellington at last reached Madrid in August, 1812, more than four years 
later than he ought to have done, according to the strategists of Parliament 
and the Press. This was all forgotten at the moment, so magic a wand is 
held by success. The fickle voice of popular applause was again heard, echo- 
ing the spirit of confidence which his persistent and undaunted conduct had 
revived in the hearts of his countrymen. His career of victory, however, 
was destined not to be unchecked ; and when, after his occupation of 
Madrid, his unsuccessful assault upon the Castle of Burgos rendered a 
retreat to the Portuguese frontier and the evacuation of the capital a proper 
military movement, although that retreat was compensated for by the aban- 
donment of Andalusia by the French, in order to concentrate their whole 
force against him, still the blind multitude could not be made to understand 
it, and began again to murmur. 

It is not now difficult to see that the victory at Salamanca was really 
what the far-seeing sagacity of Marshal Soult predicted at the time it would 
become, " a prodigious historical event," that it was the pivot on which at 
that time hinged the destinies of England, one of those battles of which we 
see perhaps a dozen only in the whole course of history, which are really 
decisive of the fate of empires. It completely unloosed the French power 
in the Peninsula, and prepared the way for the great success of Yittoria, the 
next year, which gave the coup de grace to the French military occupation 
of Spain. It is not our present purpose to trace the history of the next 
campaign, but it is curious to observe the effects produced by assured suc- 
cess upon that public opinion which had shifted so often and so strangely 
during the progress of this eventful struggle. The opposition, as their 
only hope of escape from political annihilation, and thinking to swim with 
the popular current, abused the ministers for not supporting Wellington 
with sufficient earnestness, complaining that they had taken the advice 
which they themselves had so often and so eloquently tendered. But it 
was of no avail. This wretched charlatanism was too transparent to im- 
pose upon any one ; and of the great party who opposed the war, no one 
ever after rflse to office or power in England. It required a whole genera- 
tion, in the opinion of the English constituencies, to expiate the faults of 
those who had sneered at the great Duke, and had called the glorious fields 



10 HOW A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 

of Vimeiro, Busaco, Talavera, Fuentes d'Onor, Ciudacl Rodrigo, and Badajoz, 
names which had become associated with the proudest recollections of Eng. 
lish renown, " mere barren victories, equal in their effects to defeats." 

We pass now to the consideration of another class of difficulties inherent 
in the prosecution of every war, and generally of far greater magnitude 
than any other — those connected with the raising of the vast sums of 
money required for the support of military operations. In this important 
matter, if we mistake not, there are some striking points of resemblance 
between the English experience during the war and our present situation. 
It is the fashion among many who seek to excite the public alarm on this 
subject from unworthy, and sometimes, it may be feared, from treasonable 
motives, to represent the enormous outlay of the nation's wealth which is 
poured out to save the nation's life, as wholly unparalleled in history. . Yet 
it may be asserted, without any fear of contradiction, that England, with a 
population then little more than half of that which now inhabits our loyal 
States, with resources infinitely less in proportion at that time than our 
own, her manufacturing industry, so far as external outlet was concerned, 
wholly crippled by the operation of the French continental system, and her 
own Orders in Council, expended, during every year of the Peninsular 
War, as large a sum as has been required here each year to create and 
keep up the gigantic force now in arms to put down the rebellion. During 
the five years that the war lasted, her average annual expenditure exceeded 
ninety millions of pounds sterling, or four hundred and fifty millions of 
dollars, which is about the same sum which is demanded of us. No one, of 
course, pretends to say that this rate of expenditure is not appalling, yet it 
concerns us to know that it is not unprecedented, and that these vast 
amounts have been raised from national resources far inferior to our own. 
It should not be forgotten, also, that they represent the money price of Eng- 
land's independence, and if ours is secured by a far greater outlay, we cer- 
tainly are not disposed to quarrel with the wisdom of the investment. 

The question is, how were these immense sums raised in England ? The 
man who would have predicted, at' the commencement of the war with 
France, that the English national debt would at its close exceed one thou- 
sand millions of pounds sterling, and that the country would be able to 
bear such a burden, would have been regarded as visionary, and as wild as 
he who in this country, two years ago, might have foretold the present 
amount of our national debt, and have contended that, in spite of it, the 
public credit would remain unimpaired. The difficulty in England of rais- 
ing these vast sums was tenfold greater than it is here. Napoleon, looking 
upon England as the Southern people have been taught to regard us, as a 
purely commercial nation, undoubtedly placed more reliance for success 
upon the instinct of money-getting, which would shrink from the pecuniary 
sacrifices necessary in a prolonged struggle, than upon the mere victories of 
his army. Hence he pursued, during his whole career, an inflexible pur- 
pose of ruining English commerce, and by a series of measures known as 
the Continental system, endeavored to exclude English ships and English 
products from the markets of the world. The effect of theSe measures, 
although not so serious as he wished and had anticipated, nevertheless 



HOW A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG "WAR. 11 

crippled enormously the resources of England just at the period when they 
were most needed. 

Taking the three years before the issuing of the Orders in Council, and the 
vigorous enforcement of the Continental system, which were coincident in 
point of time with the commencement of the Spanish war, the average 
annual exports sank from fifty-seven millions to twenty-three millions, 
taking the average of three years after they had been in operation. 
Taxes were laid on at a most burdensome rate. The income tax was 
ten per cent, and besides, specific war taxes, amounting to more than 
twent} r millions a year, were imposed. Notwithstanding all these taxes 
the debt increased more than one thousand millions of dollars during the 
Peninsular War. Discontent and violence among the laboring classes be- 
came universal, and it was remarked that the achievement of the greatest 
victories in Spain was celebrated in England "amidst a population who 
had been prevented by the burden of taxation on the absolute necessaries 
of life, from securing a livelihood by the strictest industry, and thus pau- 
perism had been generated throughout the land, a pauperism aggravated by 
a spirit of pillage, which it required a strong military force to repress." 
Bankruptcy and ruin fell upon the trading classes, and absolute exhaustion of 
the resources of the country seemed almost reached. The public stocks had 
sunk to such a degree that the three per cents, which are now always above 
ninety per cent, were rarely higher during the war than sixty-five per cent, 
and so depressed at last had the public credit become, that the last loan of 
the Continental war, that of April, 1815, was taken by the contractor at fifty- 
three per cent, and paid for in the depreciated paper of the day ; and yet the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer was congratulated even by the opposition for 
having made a " good operation." The Bank was in a state of chronic 
suspension, the buying and selling of gold were prohibited to the public 
under severe penalties, and yet every gold guinea which was sent by the 
government to the army in Spain (and nothing else would answer the pur- 
pose of money in that country) cost thirty per cent premium. How Eng- 
land survived all this complication of troubles is one of the marvels of 
history, but it is not our purpose to discuss that question. The great fact 
that the money required was somehow raised is all that we have to do 
with at present. When we have been at war for twenty years, and are 
forced, in order to raise the means of carrying it on, to submit to one 
tithe of the sacrifices which were endured by the English, we may then 
perhaps begin seriously to consider the money value of the Union. 

The lesson which this review of the progress of the Peninsular War 
teaches, is, it seems to us, one of hope and encouragement, for if it shows 
any thing, it proves clearly that in the support of public opinion, and in the 
means requisite to maintain a great army, those fundamental essentials of 
real military success, our Government is immeasurably stronger than the 
English ever was at any period of the war. It teaches also another import- 
ant lesson, and that is, that there is such a thing as public opinion falsely 
so called, which is noisy just in proportion as its real influence is narrow 
and restricted. One of the most difficult and delicate tasks of the states- 
man is to distinguish the true from this false opinion, the factious dema- 
gogue from the grumbling but sincere patriot, and to recognize with a ready 



12 HOW A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG "WAR. 

instinct the voice which comes from the depths of the great heart of the 
people, in warning it may be sometimes, in encouragement often, but 
always echoing its abiding faith in the ultimate triumph of the good 
cause. 

We have confined ourselves in our illustrations to the discussion of ques- 
tions as they affected the success of purely military operations, because we 
feel that here our grand business is to clear away the obstacles, real or 
fancied, which may in any way impair our military efficiency. In military 
success alone, we are firmly convinced, is to be found the true solution of 
our whole difficulty, the only force which can give vitality or permanence 
to any theory of settlement. As the matter now stands, it is idle to hope 
for either peace or safety until this question of military superiority is un- 
mistakably and definitely settled. Upon this point, then, the increase of 
our military efficienc)'-, which embraces not merely the improvement of the 
condition of the army, but also, as we have endeavored to show by English 
examples, and in a greater degree than is often supposed, the support 
of the Government in its general policy of conducting the war, should 
the efforts of all those who influence public opinion be concentrated. 

There is a certain class of men among us, not very numerous, per- 
haps, but still, owing to their position and culture, of considerable influ- 
ence, who, accustomed to find in the European armies their standard of 
military efficiency, are disposed to doubt whether a force, composed as 
ours is of totally different materials, can accomplish great results. We 
may admit at once the superiority of foreign military organization, the result 
of the traditions of centuries of military experience, digested into a thorough 
system, and carried out by long trained officers perfectly versed in the 
details of the service. Much inconvenience has necessarily resulted in our 
case from the ignorance of regimental officers, to a greater degree probably, 
however, from a want of proper care and attention on their part to the 
troops when in camp, than from any gross incompetency or misconduct 
on the field of battle. Instances of such misconduct there have un- 
doubtedly been, but, considering the number of the officers and their vrant 
of experience, those instances are extremely rare, and when we call to mind 
the number of officers who have fallen, while leading their men in battle, 
out of proportion, as it undoubtedly is, with the losses in other wars, 
we may well palliate deficiencies in this respect, out of considerations for 
their heroic gallantry and devotion. We do not underrate certainly the 
value of good officers, but history tells us that great victories have been 
achieved by armies who were no better led than ours. The incompetency 
of his officers was one of Wellington's standing complaints in Spain. 
Most of them knew absolutely nothing beyond the mere routine of garrison 
duty; they were all what is technically called "gentlemen," for each one 
had purchased his commission at a high price, but they had had no sys- 
tematic training in military schools ; nearly all of them had had no actual 
experience of war, and their average intelligence was undoubtedly below 
that of the men who hold similar positions in our army.* All accounts 

* Wz have no room to enumerate in detail the complaints made by the Duke 
of the officers of his army. Those who are interested in the subject may consult 



HOW A FKEE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 13 

agree that at that period the scientific branches of the great art of war 
were almost wholly neglected in the British army, and such was the happy 
ignorance of the elements of strategy, that at a court-martial composed of 
general officers for the trial of General Whitelock in 1808, for his failure 
at Buenos Ayres, it was necessary to explain to the court what was meant 
in military phrase by the " right bank " of a river. 

It is said again, by those who have the standard of foreign armies 
before their eyes, that among our soldiers there is not a proper defer- 
ence to rank, too much camaraderie in short, and that this is fatal to 
discipline. But it should be remembered that mere formal discipline may 
be one thing, and the true spirit of discipline another, and yet both may 
answer the same purpose. The first may be more showy than the latter, 
but not more valuable to real military efficiency. Every thing depends 
upon the character of the soldier who is to be governed by it. The 
British army is composed, as we all know, of the refuse of the popula- 
tion, and in the war in the Peninsula it was largely reenforced by the 
introduction into its ranks of convicts taken from the hulks, who were 
there expiating infamous offenses. With such men, motives based on a 
sense of duty were powerless. Drunkenness, theft, marauding, a muti- 
nous spirit under privations, and a fierce thirst of license which defied all 
control in the hour of victory, these were the brutal passions which 
could only be checked by the equally brute hand of force. But from 
such a vile herd, made useful only as a slave is made useful, by fear of 
the lash, to the civilized, sober, well-educated American citizen, animated 
with the consciousness that he is fighting for a great cause, in the suc- 
cess of which he and his children have a deep personal interest, and 
who learns obedience because both his common-sense and his sense of 
duty recognize its necessity, how immeasurable is the distance ! The 
American volunteer, in this respect, has not had justice done to his excel- 
lence. He is certainly a soldier essentially sui generis, and when we hear 
sneers at his want of discipline, let us remember that although he may not 
regard his officers as superior beings, yet experience has already shown that 
in the cheerful performance of his new duties under privations ; in his free- 
dom from those vices which in many minds are inseparably associated with 
the very idea of a soldier ; in his courage, endurance, and steadiness in 
battle ; and, more than all, in those higher qualities which are the fruit of 
his education, general intelligence, and love of country, he presents himself 
to us as a figure hitherto wholly unknown in military history. 

Col. Garwood's 4th volume, pages 343, 346, 352, 363, 385, 399, and 407. The 
whole story is summed up, however, in the general order occasioned by the dis- 
orderly retreat from Burgos, in which the Duke said " that discipline had dete- 
riorated during the campaign in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed, or 
ever read of in any army, and this, without any disaster, or any unusual privation 
or hardship, that the officers had from the first lost all command over their men, 
and that the true cause of this unhappy state of afiairs was to be found in the 
habitual neglect of duty by the Regimental Officers." This is the army of which the 
Duke said later, that " with it, he could go any where and do any thing," and, good 
or bad, it saved Europe — in the English sense. 



14 nOAV A FKEE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAB. 

One of the most cruel statements which party rancor has circulated in 
regard to the condition of the army is, that the rate of sickness and mortal- 
ity is excessive, and that this is due to the neglect of the Government. 
Fortunately we have the means of showing that these statements are false. 
From June 1, 1861, to March 1, 1862 — nine months — the annual rate of 
mortality for the whole army is ascertained to be 53 in a thousand, and the 
sickness rate 104 in a thousand. The returns for the summer campaigns 
are not yet printed, but it will appear from them, that in the army of the 
Potomac on the 10th of June, after the battle of Fair Oaks, and while the 
army was encamped on the Chickahominy, the whole number of sick, pre- 
sent and absent, compared with the whole force of that army, present and 
absent, was 128 in a thousand. During the stay of the army on the Penin- 
sula it lost less than 14,000 men by death, from disease and wounds, and 
the annual sickness rate during the campaign was about that which has for 
some time prevailed in the whole army, less than ten per cent of the whole 
force. It appears, strange to say, that the army was more healthy when in 
the trenches before Yorktown, than at any other period of the campaign. 
Compare this with the English experience. We have already said that 
Wellington lost about one third of his whole army from malarious fever on 
his retreat from Talavera : on the 1st of October, 1811, the Anglo-Portu- 
guese army had 56,000 men fit for duty, and 23,000 sick in hospitals; and 
in the Crimea, while the annual rate of mortality for the whole war was 232 
in a thousand, the period of active operations, the last three months of 1854 
and the first three months of 1855, shows the fearful rate of 711 deaths in 
every thousand men. 

It can not be'doubted that to many the most unfavorable symptom of our 
present condition is the slow progress of our arms. This slowness is more 
apparent than real, for the history of modern warfare scarcely shows an in- 
stance in which so great real progress has been made in the same space of 
time, and it is manifest that whenever our Northern soldiers have had a 
chance of fighting the enemy on any thing like equal terms, they have fully 
maintained their superiority. It is none the less true, however, that public 
expectation in this matter has been much disappointed, and it is curious to 
look at some of the explanations given for it. The Prince de Joinville, in 
his recent pamphlet, speaking of the battle of Fair Oaks, and of the neglect 
to throw bridges over the Chickahominy at the proper time, by means of 
which the whole rebel army might have been taken in flank, and probably 
destroyed, ascribes the neglect on one page to what he calls la lenteur Ameri- 
caine, which he seems to think always leads our countrymen to let the chance 
slip of doing the right thing at the right time, and again on the next to "faute 
d? organisation faute, de hierarchic, faute de lien, qui en resulte entre Tame du 
chef et Varmie, lien puissant qui permet a un General de demander a ses 
soldats et cTen obtenir aveuglement ces efforts extraordinaires qui gagnent 
les lattailles." In other words, General McClellan, knowing that he could 
gain a decisive victory by laying down half a dozen bridges, which, it is 
stated, were all ready for the purpose, actually refused to order his soldiers 
to do it, because he was afraid they would not obey his orders. And this 
is the Prince's judgment of an army, which, a few weeks later, according to 
his own account, fought five battles in as many days, all, with one excep- 



I10W A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 15 

tion, victories over an enemy at least double its numbers, and arrived at its 
new base on the James River in excellent condition, and without the slight- 
est taint of demoralization. This illustration shows the absurdity of ascrib- 
ing the want of immediate success to la lenteur Americaine, a quality, by 
the way, which we learn for the first time is one of our national character- 
istics. 

Among the many causes which might be named, all perfectly legitimate, 
and presenting no obstacle which a little experience will not remove, we 
venture to suggest but one, and that is the character of the early military 
education of our higher officers. The system pursued at West Point, 
although admirable for qualifying officers for the scientific and staff corps 
of the army, seems to fail in teaching the young soldier, what is just now 
the most important quality he can possess for command, the character and 
capacity of volunteer soldiers. The system of discipline he has been taught 
is that which governs the regular army, a system modeled upon the Eng- 
lish, which is, with the exception of that in use in Russia, the most brutal 
and demoralizing known in any army in Europe. No wonder, therefore, 
that when our educated soldiers are suddenly placed in high positions, and 
with great responsibilities, and when they discover that the sort of disci- 
pline which the}' have been taught is wholly out of place in securing the 
efficiency of a volunteer army, they are led to doubt whether it can ever be 
made efficient at all. These prejudices, however, are wearing awa}- before 
the test of actual experience. Generals are gradually learning that they 
may confide in their men, even for desperate undertakings ; they begin to 
see in their true light the many eminent qualities of the volunteer ; and he, 
in turn, begins to understand something of that military system which 
seemed at first so irksome and meaningless to him ; and the advance of the 
army in the essentials of discipline has been proportionably rapid. 

There is a good deal of talk about the impossibility of conquering or sub- 
jugating the South, which is based upon very vague notions of what con- 
quest and subjugation signify. It is surprising to find how even intelligent 
men have been imposed upon by this favorite boast of the rebels and their 
sympathizers. A pretended saj-ing of Napoleon is quoted, that "it is im- 
possible to prevent any people determined on achieving its independence, 
from accomplishing its purpose ;" and it is confidently asked whether any 
one ever heard of the subjugation of twelve millions of people determined to 
be free. We reply, that history, ancient and modern, is full of instances of 
the only sort of conquest or subjugation which any sane man proposes shall 
be submitted to bj* the South. No one thinks it possible or necessary, for the 
purpose in view, to occupy the whole South with garrisons, but simply to 
destroy the only support upon which its arrogant pretensions are based, 
namely, its military power. This gone, what becomes of all the rest ? and 
this remaining, where is there any hope of permanent peace and safety to 
us ? For what is all war, but an appeal to force to settle questions of na- 
tional interest which peaceful discussion has failed to settle ; and what is an 
army but only another argument, the ultima ratio, which, if successful in 
decisive battles, must give the law to the conquered ? To say nothing of 
instances in ancient history, Poland, Hungary, and Lombardy, in our day, 
were iust as determined to be free as the South is, and quite as full of mar- 



16 HOW A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 

tial ardor ; and certainly Prussia, Spain under the Bonaparte dynasty, and 
the French Empire, are all examples of nations which valued their indepen- 
dence, and had tenfold the resources for maintaining it which the South 
possesses ; yet the capture of Warsaw, the surrender of Villages, the bat- 
tles of Novara, of Jena, of Salamanca, and of Waterloo, respectively, settled 
as definitively the fate of the inhabitants of those countries, and their future 
condition, as if the terms imposed by the conquering army had been freely 
and unanimously agreed upon by the representatives of the people in Con- 
gress assembled. And, in like manner, can any one doubt, looking at the 
present comparative resources of the two sections, that if we should gain 
two decisive battles, one in the East and the other in the West, which 
should result in the total disorganization of the two rebel armies, and thus 
enable us to interpose an impassable barrier between them, we should soon 
hear a voice imploring in unmistakable accents peace on our own terms ? 
It would not be a matter of choice, but of necessity ; a simple question of 
how far the progress of exhaustion had been carried, and that once settled, 
and no reasonable hope of success remaining, the war would not last a week 
longer. This is the experience of all nations, and our Southern rebels, not- 
withstanding their noisy boasting, do not differ in their capacity of resist- 
ance from the rest of mankind. " Hard pounding this, gentlemen," said 
the Duke of Wellington to his officers, as he threw himself within one of the 
unbroken squares of his heroic infantry at Waterloo, "but we'll see toho can 
pound the longest ;" and the ability of that infantry to "pound the long- 
est" on that day settled the fate of Europe for generations. 

Let us bend, then, our united energies to secure, as much as in us lies, 
success in the field, and that success gained, we may be sure that all things 
will follow. Let us recognize with confidence as co-workers in this great 
object all, never mind what opinions they may entertain about the causes 
of the war and the new issues which its progress has developed, who desire 
in all sincerity, no matter from what motive, the success of our arms. 
Upon such a basis, the wider and more catholic our faith becomes the bet- 
ter. " In essentials, Unity ; in non-essentials, Liberty ; in all things, Char, 
ity :" this should be our motto. The only possible hope for the South is 
in our own divisions. Let us remember that with success all things are 
possible ; without it, all our hopes and theories vanish into thin air. With 
success in the field, we should not only disarm the rebellion, and rid our- 
selves forever of the pestilent tribe of domestic traitors by burying them 
deep in that political oblivion which covers the Tories of the Kevolution, 
and those who sneered at the gallant exploits of our Navy in the' war of 
1812, but also force public opinion abroad, whose faithlessness to the great 
principles which underlie all modern civilization has been one of the saddest 
developments of this sad war, to exclaim at last, " Invidiam glorid. 
superasti.'" 

Loyal Leagues, Clubs, and Newsvenders will be 
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